We consider a large queueing system that consists of many strategic servers that are weakly interacting. Each server processes jobs from its unique critically loaded buffer and controls the rate of arrivals and departures associated with its queue to minimize its expected cost. The rates and the cost functions in addition to depending on the control action, can depend, in a symmetric fashion, on the size of the individual queue and the empirical measure of the states of all queues in the system. In order to determine an approximate Nash equilibrium for this finite player game we construct a Lasry-Lions type mean-field game (MFG) for certain reflected diffusions that governs the limiting behavior. Under conditions, we establish the convergence of the Nash-equilibrium value for the finite size queuing system to the value of the MFG. In general closed form solutions of such MFG are not available and thus numerical methods are needed. We use the Markov chain approximation method to construct approximations for the solution of the MFG and establish convergence of the numerical scheme over a small time interval.
Introduction
Rate controlled queueing systems commonly arise from applications in communication systems, see e.g. [26, 44, 4, 19] and references therein. Recently, they have also been considered in modeling limit order books, see e.g. [8, 9, 36, 17, 13, 46] . A common approach to the study of such rate control problems when the system is in heavy traffic is through diffusion approximations. In a problem setting where there is interaction between servers/queues in that the rates or costs associated with a particular queue and server can depend on the states of the other queues, this approach leads to a stochastic control problem for n-dimensional reflected diffusions, where n is the number of queues in the system. When n is large such control problems are computationally intractable and in general this 'curse of dimensionality' is unavoidable. However, when there are certain symmetries present and the interaction between queues is weak, in that each queue has O(1/n) affect on any other queue in the system, a natural approach is to consider, in addition to heavy traffic, another asymptotic regime where the number of queues n approaches ∞ as well. Such model settings arise in many applications, e.g., cloud computing, live streaming, limit order books, customer service systems, etc. In many of these contexts the servers are strategic, for example, in customer service networks, servers respond to workload incentives (see [32] ), and in the context of limit order books buyers and sellers place their orders in a strategic manner and interact weakly through their impact on the price distribution.
We study one of the simplest forms of queuing networks, namely a collection of n single server queues. The system is assumed to be critically loaded. For this, we fix an arbitrary sequence of scaling parameters {e n } n that satisfy e n → ∞ when n → ∞. We assume that, for each queue, the traffic intensity, which is the ratio between the rate of arrivals to the rate of service is 1 − O(1/ √ e n ) (see [23] ). The arrival and service rates for each queue are O(e n ).
In absence of control and state dependence of rates, the analysis simply reduces to that of a single M/M/1 queue which in the heavy traffic can be approximated by a one dimensional reflected Brownian motion. In the setting we consider, every server can exercise control on the arrival and service rates associated with its own queue. This control which is O( √ e n ) is of lower order compared to the overall rate but it can have significant impact on performance in the asymptotic regime we consider. In the heavy traffic regime with a fixed number of servers, performance improvement using an O( √ e n ) control has been well studied (see for example [44, Chapter 9] ). In a setting (that is quite different from the one considered here) where the number of nodes/servers approach ∞, numerical results that show performance improvement under O( √ e n ) controls can be found in [18] . In the model we consider, the rates can depend on the state of the individual queue, furthermore a particular queue's state is influenced by the remaining queue states through their empirical measure. The control action for each server can use information on the history of queue lengths, arrival and processing times and control actions for all the queues in the system. We consider a rate control problem where each server aims to minimize its individual cost. Although many different types of cost criteria can be considered, here for simplicity we consider a cost function over a finite time horizon. This cost function may depend on the individual queue lengths, the control action, and the empirical measure of all the queue states. A natural way to formulate optimality for such n-player games is through the notion of a (near) Nash equilibrium. Computing Nash equilibria, even if one considers the simplified heavy traffic approximation in terms of reflected diffusions, is computationally a very challenging problem when n is large. The goal of this work is to analyze an asymptotic formulation where simultaneously each queue approaches heavy traffic and the number of queues approaches ∞. There is extensive literature on heavy traffic limits of rate controlled queuing systems with a fixed number of queues [44, 4, 19] , however to the best of our knowledge this is the first work to study the asymptotics for controlled queues where in addition to heavy traffic, the number of queues approach infinity as well. We will show that the asymptotics in this regime is governed by a Lasry-Lions type mean field game (MFG) for reflected diffusions. We will use the solution of the MFG to construct an asymptotic Nash equilibrium for the n-player queueing system. This equilibrium has a simple and appealing decentralized structure: each server bases his decision only upon the length of his own queue and a deterministic measure valued function obtained from the solution of the MFG. We also prove that the value of the above near Nash equilibrium converges to the value function of the MFG as n → ∞. In general closed form solutions for MFG of the form that arise here are not available and thus one needs numerical approximations. In our work we study one such procedure that uses the Markov chain approximation method ( [45] ) and establish convergence of the scheme over a small time interval.
The theory of mean field games was initiated a decade ago in the seminal work of Lasry and Lions [49, 50, 51] , and Huang, Malhamé, and Caines [39, 38] . In recent years there has been a growing interest in this field. For recent theoretical developments and applications of this theory see [20, 35, 31, 21, 48, 22, 47, 27] and references therein. Mean field approximations for weakly interacting stochastic particles have a long history starting from the works of Boltzmann, McKean, Kac and others (see [57] and references therein). Even in the context of queuing systems and communication networks, there have been many works [30, 5, 40, 60, 16, 33, 11, 14, 34, 3, 18] . Another related branch is agent based models with mean-field interaction (but without strategic agents), see e.g. [29, 6, 7] . MFGs have also been used by queuing theorists as a tool in recent years see e.g. [54, 61, 52, 46] . In contrast to these works we consider an MFG associated with queuing systems in heavy traffic.
We now make some comments on proof techniques. Roughly speaking, solution of an MFG considered here can be viewed as the solution of a fixed point problem on the space of probability measures on certain path spaces (see Section 3) . In order to characterize such solutions, in a setting where each agent's state evolution is described through a diffusion process, Lasry and Lions [49, 50, 51] studied wellposedness of two coupled nonlinear partial differential equations; one is an equation of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) type while the second takes the form of a Kolmogorov forward equation. A somewhat different approach is taken in recent works of Carmona, Delarue, and Lacker [21, 22] . Using probabilistic methods, authors characterize the MFG solution as a solution to certain forward backward stochastic differential equations. In all the above papers the n-player system is described through a collection of stochastic differential equations and the mean field game gives the asymptotic behavior of the system as n → ∞. In contrast, in the current work, for a fixed value of n the state process is given through a collection of controlled jump-Markov processes with jump sizes that approach 0 as n → ∞. Thus here we have two forms of asymptotic behavior, one corresponds to the large agent limit while the other corresponds to diffusion approximations of pure jump processes with vanishing jump sizes. Analyzing this simultaneous limit behavior, which is key to the proof of Theorem 4.1 that identifies an asymptotic Nash equilibrium for the n-player game as n → ∞, requires new techniques. A key ingredient is to prove suitable tightness properties and to analyze and characterize the weak limit points of certain stochastic processes and random measures. Here we make use of a result from [42] (see Lemma 4.2 therein) which can be viewed as an extension of de Finetti's theorem for sequences of random measures on certain path spaces. In proving suitable tightness properties of control processes we consider a relaxed control formulation. Our assumption on the uniqueness of the minimizer (Assumption 3.1(b)) ensures that extending the class of controls in this manner does not lower the cost. Such relaxed control formulations have been widely used in stochastic control theory, see e.g. [28, 25, 15, 45] . More recently, they have also been invoked in the study of mean field games [48, 47, 27] . Other key ingredients needed for the proof are (a) regularity properties of the optimal feedback controls for certain stochastic control problems for reflected diffusions; (b) weak formulation of stochastic control problems for reflected diffusions. We find that the approach based on HJB characterizations of value functions is particularly well suited for our problem setting. In particular, regularity results from [53] for quasilinear PDE with Neumann boundary conditions give us the required estimates for obtaining the desired properties of the optimal feedback controls. Use of HJB theory in our analysis is a feature that is common to the approach initiated by Lasry and Lions, however a point of departure is that instead of using Kolmogorov forward equations we characterize probability distributions as unique weak solutions of suitable reflected diffusions. In this sense our approach is closer to [22] although, unlike [22] , we do not make use of forward backward stochastic differential equations in our work. In the final section of this work we provide a numerical scheme for solving the MFG and under conditions prove convergence over a small time interval (Theorem 5.1). Viscosity solution methods for numerical approximations of MFG have been studied in [1] . Here we consider a probabilistic approach based on a Markov chain approximation method [45] . The convergence proof once more relies on weak convergence arguments of the form used in the proof of Theorem 4.1. The key result is Proposition 5.1 which establishes an 'almost contraction' property that is uniform in the discretization parameter over a fixed small interval. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work to develop a numerical scheme based on Markov chain approximations for an MFG problem.
In summary our main contributions are as follows. We
• consider a rate control problem for large symmetric queuing systems in heavy traffic with strategic servers;
• introduce an MFG for controlled reflected diffusions, and in Theorem 3.1 establish its solvability under Assumption 3.1, and prove unique solvability assuming in addition Assumption 3.2;
• use the solution of a diffusion MFG to construct, under Assumptions 3.1 and 4.1, an asymptotically optimal Nash equilibrium for the n player countable state game using techniques that combine heavy traffic analysis with large agent asymptotics (Theorem 4.1);
• develop a numerical scheme to solve the MFG that under Assumptions 3.1, 5.1, and 5.2 converges over a small time interval (Theorem 5.1).
Thus Assumption 3.1 is a basic assumption for all our results. This assumption imposes Lipschitz continuity of the various functions in the model. Assumption 3.2, that is introduced for the uniqueness of the solution of the MFG, is common in the literature of MFG. It says that the drift is independent of the mean-field term and that the running cost and terminal cost satisfy a certain monotonicity property, see Remark 3.1 for a discussion of the assumption. In order to obtain a asymptotic Nash-equilibrium, we require, in addition to Assumption 3.1, Assumption 4.1 which as the first part of Assumption 3.2 says that the drift is free of the meanfield term and in addition requires a basic convergence property for the initial conditions . For this result we do not require the monotonicity property, in particular the uniqueness of the solution of the MFG is not needed. For the convergence of the numerical scheme, we require, in addition to Assumption 3.1, Assumption 5.1 that imposes some regularity conditions on the optimal control, and Assumption 5.2 that says that the MFG has a unique solution. Remark 5.1 provides a basic example where all conditions are satisfied and discusses their modeling implications. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the queueing model, the scaling regime and the cost criterion. Next in Section 3 we introduce the MFG and present our main result on its solvability (Theorem 3.1). Section 4 constructs an asymptotic Nash equilibrium for the n-player game and the main result of this section is Theorem 4.1 which proves asymptotic optimality. In Section 5 we provide a numerical scheme for solving the MFG. Section 6 provides proofs of some auxiliary results from Section 5.
Notation
We use the following notation. For t ∈ (0, ∞) and a function f :
For metric spaces S 1 , S 2 denote by C(S 1 : S 2 ) the space of S 2 valued continuous functions on S 1 . When S 2 = R, we abbreviate the notation to simply C(S 1 ). The space C([0, T ] : S) for a Polish space S will be equipped with the uniform topology. We will denote by D([0, T ] : S) the space of S valued functions that are right continuous and have left limits (RCLL) defined on [0, T ]. This space is equipped with the usual Skorohod topology. For
In case that d = 1, we often use |f | t . We will denote by Lip 1 (S) the space of real Lipschitz functions on S whose Lipschitz norm is bounded by 1, namely the class of functions f : S → R with
where d denotes the metric on S. Denote by P(S) the space of probability measures on S. We endow P(S) with the topology of weak convergence of measures. Convergence in distribution of S valued random variable X n to X will be denoted as X n ⇒ X. For T, L ∈ (0, ∞), the space P(C([0, T ] : [0, L])) will be denoted as P T,L . The Wasserstein distance of order 1 on P(S), where S is a compact metric space, is defined as
where η, η ′ ∈ P(S). We denote by
R that are continuously differentiable (resp., twice continuously differentiable) with respect to (w.r.t.) the first (resp., second) variable and are such that the function and the derivatives extend continuously to
the time derivative and the first two space derivatives of φ, respectively. For x ∈ S, δ x ∈ P(S) denotes the Dirac measure at x.
2 The n-server queuing control problem
We consider a symmetric n-server stochastic queueing system. Each server i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is associated with a queue with a finite capacity and is able to control the rates of the service and arrivals of jobs to its queue. The rates can also depend on the state of the queue and on the empirical measure of the states of all the n-queues. We will consider a regime where the arrival and processing rates are approximately the same and are of the same order as the number of queues in the system. We now describe our precise scaling regime and introduce the various processes that determine the evolution of the state of the system.
Diffusion scaling
Fix T, L > 0 and n ∈ N. Here T denotes the terminal time of our finite time horizon and [0, L] will be the state space of the scaled queue length process. Let U be a compact subset of R.
We will denote by λ n,i and µ n,i the (controlled) arrival and service rates associated with queue i. Fix an arbitrary sequence of scaling parameters {e n } n that satisfy e n → ∞ when n → ∞. The rates will be O( √ e n ) perturbations of certain nominal (uncontrolled) O(e n ) overall rates.
More precisely, we assume that there existλ,μ > 0, and bounded and measurable functions λ, µ :
is the size of the i-th queue at time t,
is the empirical distribution of the scaled queue lengths in the n-th system at time t, and α n,i (t) is the control that server i exercises at time t. The term o( √ e n ) represents an expression of the form r n (t,ν n (t),Q n,i (t), α n,i (t)) where r n :
functions such that r n / √ e n converges uniformly to 0 as n → ∞. Additional conditions on λ and µ will be introduced in later sections. Each server in the n-th system has a finite buffer of size L n = √ e n L and arriving jobs to a full buffer are lost. We assume that the system is in heavy traffic, namelyλ =μ.
We now give a precise description of controlled stochastic processes of interest. For each fixed n, let (Ω ′ , F ′ , P ′ ) be a probability space on which are given unit rate independent Poisson processes N n,i and M n,i , i = 1, . . . , n. Roughly speaking, N n,i will correspond to the stream of jobs entering the i-the queue and M n,i to the jobs that leave the system after service. The evolution of the i-th controlled queue is given as follows.
where Q n,i (0) ≥ 0 is the initial size of the i-th queue,
are the arrival and departure processes respectively, where λ n,i and µ n,i are defined as in (2.1) in terms of control processes {α n,i }. We will assume that {Q n,i (0)} n i=1 are exchangeable for all n. We require that the control processes are suitably non-anticipative. Specifically, we assume that for some filtration {F t } on (Ω ′ , F ′ , P ′ ), α n,i is {F t }-progressively measurable, Q n,i , n ≥ i ≥ 1 are {F t }-adapted, and
are {F t } martingales with quadratic variations
. . , n where δ ij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. The process α n = {α n,i } n i=1 will be referred to as an admissible control and we denote the collection of all such controls by U n . With an abuse of terminology, for α n = {α n,i } n i=1 as above, we will refer to α n,i as an admissible control for the i-th player.
From (2.2) we have the following evolution equation for the scaled queue length processes.
and o(1) represents a stochastic process η n,i satisfying for each i sup 0≤t≤T |η n,i (t)| → 0, in probability, as n → ∞. The above dynamics can equivalently be described in terms of a Skorohod map as we do below. Let
solve the Skorohod problem for ψ if the following properties are satisfied:
(ii) ζ i are nonnegative and nondecreasing, ζ 1 (0) = ζ 2 (0) = 0, and
We denote by Γ(ψ) = (Γ 1 , Γ 2 , Γ 3 )(ψ) = (ϕ, ζ 1 , ζ 2 ) and refer to Γ as the Skorohod map.
It is known that there is a unique solution to the Skorohod problem for every ψ ∈ D 0 [0, T ] and so the Skorohod map in Definition 2.1 is well defined. The Skorohod map has the following Lipschitz property (see [43] ).
The dynamics in (2.5) can be described in terms of the Skorohod map as follows
(2.7)
The control problem
We now introduce the cost function and the control problem studied in this work. The total expected cost for server i associated with the initial conditioñ Q n (0) = (Q n,1 (0), . . . ,Q n,n (0)) and control α n = (α n,1 , . . . , α n,n ) ∈ U n is given by
where
are the costs associated with rejection of jobs and empty buffers, respectively. Here f, g, y, and r are bounded measurable functions that will be required to satisfy additional conditions that will be introduced in Section 3 (see Assumption 3.1). Each player (server) seeks to minimize its cost. A natural formulation of optimality for such n-player games is given in terms of a (near) Nash equilibrium. Computing near Nash equilibria for such complex and large multi-player games is in general intractable and thus we instead consider an asymptotic formulation of the problem.
Definition 2.2 A sequence of admissible controls {α n,i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} n∈N is called an asymptotic Nash equilibrium if for every player j, and every sequence of admissible controls {β n } ∞ n=1 for that player, one has
Objective of this work is to show that, under conditions, an asymptotic Nash equilibrium exists which can be numerically computed (at least approximately) by analyzing a related MFG. The main results are Theorem 3.1 (solvability of MFG), Theorem 4.1 (asymptotic optimality), and Theorem 5.1 (convergence of the numerical scheme).
The MFG
A natural approach for constructing asymptotic near Nash equilibria for the above n-player game has emerged from the works of [20, 21, 22] . Starting point in this approach is to consider an MFG that formally corresponds to the limit of the above n-player games as n → ∞. In this section we give a precise description of this MFG in the current context and give our main results on existence and uniqueness of solutions.
Description of the MFG
The basic idea in the formulation of the MFG is to approximate the scaled queue length process for a typical queue by a suitable drift-controlled reflected Brownian motion. We next introduce this controlled process. Let (Ω, F, {F t }, P) be a filtered probability space on which is given a one dimensional standard F t -Brownian motion B. We will refer to the collection (Ω, F, {F t }, P, B) as a system and denote it by Ξ. Given x ∈ [0, L], t ∈ [0, T ], and ν ∈ P T,L , we denote by A(Ξ, t, x, ν) the collection of all pairs (α, Z) where
is the marginal of ν at time instant s and σ = 2λ. We now introduce the cost function in the MFG.
, and a system Ξ as above, let (α, Z) ∈ A(Ξ, t, x, ν). Define
We define the value function associated with the above cost as:
If there exists a unique such ν, we refer to V ν (0, x) as the value of the MFG with initial condition x.
To find a solution of the MFG one usually follows the following iterative procedure:
(i) For a fixed ν ∈ P T,L solve the stochastic control problem (3.3)(with t = 0), namely find a system Ξ and (α, Z) ∈ A(Ξ, 0, x, ν) such that (3.4) holds. Denote byν the law of X where Z = (X, Y, R) and writeν = Φ(ν) (this is not precise since in general there may be more than one solution of the stochastic control problem in (3.3)).
(ii) Find the fixed point of the map Φ, namely aν ∈ P T,L for whichν = Φ(ν). Note that by definition, such aν will be a solution of the MFG.
We now analyze the MFG by following the above steps. The main result is Theorem 3.1 which gives existence of solutions of the MFG under suitable conditions and proves uniqueness of solutions under stronger conditions.
Solving the stochastic control problem (3.3)
For c ∈ (0, ∞), let M c be the collection of all ν ∈ P T,L such that
and let
and with an abuse of notation we denote this continuous function once more as ν.
As one might expect, the value function V ν (t, x) corresponds to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
with the boundary conditions (BC)
where H is the Hamiltonian given as
We now introduce a key condition under which the above HJB equation characterizes the value function V ν (t, x).
From Berge's maximum theorem (see [2, Theorem 17.31] ) and part (b) of the above assumption it follows thatα is a continuous function on
implies that b, f, g, y, r are bounded functions, in particular,
The first part of the condition implies Hölder-1/2 continuity in t when η is replaced by ν(t)
Similar estimates hold for b, f, r and g. Assumption 3.1 will guarantee that the value function is the unique classical solution of the HJB equation (3.5) with BC (3.6)(see Proposition 3.1). The assumption will also be used in the fixed point argument (Section 3.3), in the asymptotic analysis of the n-player game (Section 4), and for numerical approximations (Section 5). Using Girsanov's theorem it is easily checked that given a measurable function γ :
there is a unique weak solution Z to
, namely there is a system Ξ = (Ω, F, {F t }, P, B) on which is given a F s -adapted continuous process Z = (X, Y, R) solving the above equation and if
Note also that with α(s) = γ(s, X(s)), (α, Z) ∈ A(Ξ, t, x, ν). We refer to the function γ as a feedback control and we call it an optimal feedback control for the stochastic control problem in (3.3) if
The following result which is a consequence of Theorem 13.24 of [53] says that the HJB equation (3.5) with BC (3.6) admits a unique classical solution which can be characterized as the value function V ν . Moreover, there exists an optimal feedback control with certain regularity properties. We follow the notation from [53] . Let for δ ∈ (0, 1], H δ be the collection of maps
Note that such a function can be continuously extended to [0, T ] × [0, L] and we denote the extension by the same symbol. Also, let H 2+ 1 2 be the collection of continuous real functions and it is the unique solution of (3.5)-(3.6). Furthermore, withα as introduced in Assumption 3.1, the map (s,
is an optimal feedback control for (3.3) for every t ∈ (0, T ). Moreover, any optimal control α for (3.3) satisfies α(u, ω) =γ(u, X(u, ω)), λ t T ⊗ P almost surely (a.s.), where λ t T denotes the Lebesgue measure on [0, T − t]. Proof: From [53, Theorem 13.24] and the paragraph following its statement it follows that (3.5)-(3.6) admits a solution in H 2+ 1 2 . We remark that the key conditions needed to appeal to this theorem are that
and for each M ∈ (0, ∞)
Both these conditions are easily seen to hold on using Assumption 3.1 and the property that ν ∈ M c for some c < ∞ (see e.g. (3.11)). We now argue uniqueness and characterize the solution as the value function
, a system Ξ and (α, Z) ∈ A(Ξ, t, x, ν). By an application of Itô's lemma and using (3.5)-(3.6) we get
Hence, with Z = (X, Y, R),
Since Ξ, α, Z are arbitrary, we get that
Let γ be as in the statement of the proposition with V ν replaced by ψ. Let Z = (X, Y, R) be a solution of (3.12) with γ replaced byγ given on some system Ξ. Then a similar calculation using Itô's formula but with α(u) =γ(u, X(u)) shows that
This shows that ψ = V ν and so V ν is the unique H 2+ 1 2 solution of (3.5)-(3.6). Also, we have thatγ as in the statement of the lemma is an optimal feedback control.
Since
, the continuity of the map (t, x) →α(t, ν(t), x, DV ν (t, x)) is immediate from the continuity of the mapα that was noted below Assumption 3.1.
We now show thatγ is the unique optimal control for (3.3). Fix an optimal control (α, Z) ∈ A(Ξ, t, x, ν) given on some system Ξ. We claim that α(u, ω) =γ(u, X(u, ω)), λ t T × Pa.s. Indeed, suppose that there is a set with a positive λ t T × P-measure on which the equality fails. Then by Assumption 3.1.(b) together with (3.5)-(3.6), it follows that (3.13) holds with a strict inequality, which in turn implies that (3.14) holds with a strict inequality. Recalling that V ν = ψ, we arrive at a contradiction. ✷
Solving the MFG
We now turn to step (ii) in solving the fixed point problem. Although for existence of a fixed point Assumption 3.1 will suffice, in order to get uniqueness, we will need the following additional assumption. Similar assumption has been used to argue uniqueness of fixed points in previous works on MFG ( 
Moreover, for every t ∈ [0, T ] and η, η ′ ∈ P([0, L]), f 0 and g satisfy the following monotonicity property
Abusing notation, when Assumption 3.2 holds, we will write b(t, x, u) = b(t, η 0 , x, u), y(t) = y(t, η 0 ), and r(t) = r(t, η 0 ). Another natural example that satisfies this assumption is a cost function that is linear in the mean-field term. That is,
From a modeling perspective, by choosing positive and nondecreasing ψ i 's and a positive a 1 , the system planner penalizes all servers collectively when the empirical measure has high ψ i -moments and in addition it penalizes individual servers for long queues. Lemma 3.1 Let M be a non-empty convex subset of a normed space B. Let Φ be a continuous mapping of M into a compact set K ⊂ M. Then Φ has a fixed point, namely there exists
Proof of Theorem 3.1: We will apply Lemma 3.1 to the space B of finite signed measures on
which is equipped with the Kantorovich-Rubinstein norm
The distance driven by the norm, restricted to P T,L , coincides with the Wasserstein's distance of order 1 (see [59, Remark 6.5]), which due to compactness of [0, L] generates the same topology on P T,L as that for weak convergence. We now introduce a mapping Φ on the non-empty and convex set M 0 that satisfies the conditions stated in Lemma 3.1. Definition of Φ. For ν ∈ M 0 , let α ν denote the optimal feedback controlγ for (3.3) (with t = 0) given through Proposition 3.1. Let Z ν = (X ν , Y ν , R ν ) denote the unique weak solution of (3.12) with γ replaced with α ν given on some system Ξ = (Ω, F, {F t }, P, B).
whereĈ . = c S max{c B , σ}, and the last inequality uses Doob's maximal inequality. This shows that Φ(ν) ∈ M 0 for all ν ∈ M 0 .
We now show that Φ(M 0 ) is contained in a compact set in P T,L , i.e. Φ(M 0 ) is relatively compact. Relative compactness of Φ(M 0 ). For f ∈ C([0, T ] : R) and δ > 0, let
Then for ε, δ, ̺ > 0 and ν ∈ M 0 , similar to the estimate in (3.17),
Continuity of Φ. We now argue that Φ is a continuous map on M 0 . Consider a system Ξ = (Ω, F, {F t }, P, B) and let Z 0 = (X 0 , Y 0 , R 0 ) be given as
We now show that α 0 ν n → α 0 ν in λ T × P-measure. Recall thatα is a continuous map. Hence, in view of (3.20) , for the desired convergence, it is sufficient to show that
The proof is a modification of the proof of Theorem 2.1 in [37] . Applying Itô's lemma to V ν ′ (t, X 0 (t)) for fixed ν ′ ∈ M 0 and using from Proposition 3.1 the fact that V ν ′ solves (3.5)-(3.6), we have for every t ∈ [0, T ],
Let,
∆y n (t) = y(t, ν n (t)) − y(t, ν(t)), ∆r n (t) = r(t, ν n (t)) − r(t, ν(t)),
Then, (3.22) and (3.23) imply,
Squaring both sides and then taking expectations gives
We now show that lim sup n→∞ sup 0≤t≤T C n (t) = 0. Note that there exists C 1 ∈ (0, ∞) such that the following inequality holds for all n ∈ N.
Using the properties of the Skorohod map (Lemma 2.1) it follows that
The convergence of the right side of (3.26) to 0 is now immediate from Assumption 3.1(a), the boundedness of DV ν , and (3.20). Thus from (3.25) we have that
Using the second convergence in (3.27) and repeating the above argument for t ∈ [T − δ, T ] to the interval [T − 2δ, T − δ], we see that (3.27) holds with T replaced with T − δ. Proceeding recursively in this manner we have (3.21). Hence we have shown that
Using the above property we will now argue that Φ(ν n ) → Φ(ν) as n → ∞, completing the proof of continuity of Φ. Let for ν ′ ∈ M 0 ,
and let P ν ′ be a probability measure on (Ω, F) defined as
Thus to show Φ(ν n ) → Φ(ν) it suffices to argue that P ν n → P ν . We will in fact show that R(P ν P ν n ) → 0 as n → ∞, where
is the relative entropy of P ν with respect to P ν n , which due to Pinsker's inequality (see [58, Page 132]) gives the convergence of P ν n to P ν . Let
Also, noting that since b is bounded E( dP ν dP ) 2 . = κ < ∞, we have from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
. (3.30)
Next note that
The last term converges to 0 from the boundedness and continuity of b, (3.20) and (3.28) . Similarly
as n → ∞. Using the above two observations in (3.30) we have R(P ν P ν n ) → 0 and thus, as argued earlier, the proof of continuity of Φ is complete. Thus we have shown that Φ is a continuous map on M 0 , which is a non-empty convex subset of the normed space B, into a compact set K ⊂ M 0 . Thus by the fixed point theorem in Lemma 3.1, Φ has a fixed point.
The first results on unique solvability of a MFG go back to [51] . Since then uniqueness has been argued in various settings (see e.g. [20, 31, 22] ). The proof given below uses arguments similar to those in [22, Section 7.3] , however for the sake of completeness we give the details. Consider as before a system Ξ = (Ω, F, {F t }, P, B) and let Z 0 = (X 0 , Y 0 , R 0 ) be given through (3.18). Let ν 1 , ν 2 ∈ M 0 . For i = 1, 2, let α 0 ν i and P ν i be given by (3.19) and (3.29), respectively, with ν i replacing ν ′ . Applying Itô's lemma to V ν 1 (t, X 0 (t)) and recalling that V ν 1 solves (3.5)-(3.6) with ν replaced with ν 1 , we get
where recalling the form of y and r from Assumption 3.2
Observing that for t ∈ [0, T ]
we have
Similarly, applying Itô's lemma to V ν 2 (t, X 0 (t))
Substracting (3.32) from (3.31)
A similar calculation shows
By the definition of the H and the form of f in Assumption 3.2 we get,
where the last equality uses the observation that sinceα(s, η, x, p) does not depend on η,
Similarly for all s ∈ [0, T ],
Applying the last two inequalities to (3.33) and (3.34), we get
Until now ν 1 and ν 2 were arbitrary measures in M 0 . Suppose now that ν i , i = 1, 2, are fixed points of Φ. Then, for i = 1, 2, P ν i •(X 0 ) −1 = ν i and so for all s ∈ [0, T ],
In this case, using the inequalities in Assumption 3.2 we get that the inequality (3.37) can be replaced with equality. We claim that α 0 ν 1 = α 0 ν 2 , λ 0 T × P-a.s. Indeed, suppose that there is a set with positive λ 0 T × P-measure on which α 0 ν 1 = α 0 ν 2 . Then on this set (3.35) and (3.36) will hold with strict inequalities by Assumption 3.1 (b). Since the measures P, P ν 1 , and P ν 2 are equivalent, this will say that (3.37) holds with a strict inequality as well, which contradicts the equality that was established above. This proves the claim. Since b(t, η, x, u) does not depend on η we conclude from the equality of α 0 ν 1 and α 0 ν 2 thatb ν 1 (t, X 0 (t, ω)) =b ν 2 (t, X 0 (t, ω)), λ 0 T × P-a.s. and thus by (3.29), P ν 1 = P ν 2 . Combining this with the fact that ν i are fixed points of Φ, we now have
Asymptotic Nash equilibrium
The main result of this section is Theorem 4.1. The main idea in the proof is to use a solutionν to the MFG (which from Theorem 3.1 exists under Assumption 3.1) and the associated feedback control given by Proposition 3.1 in order to construct an admissible controlα n = {α n,i } n i=1
for the n-player game. Specifically, the control will be given in a feedback form through the following relationα n,i (t) . =α(t,ν(t),Q n,i (t), DVν (t,Q n,i (t))), (4.1) whereQ n,i is the corresponding scaled queue length under the feedback control. Note that the only information each of the players uses is its own state. Therefore, the problem is decentralized in the sense that players do not need to observe each others' states. Our main condition, in addition to Assumption 3.1, for {α n } to be an asymptotic Nash equilibrium is the following. It in particular says that the drift function does not depend on the mean-field term. As before, with an abuse of notation, we will write b(t, η, x, α) as b(t, x, α) when Assumption 4.1 holds. As discussed in Remark 3.1, part (a) of the assumption means that the empirical measure affects the drift only through the control, which in turn is affected by the empirical measure through the running cost. Recall the probability space (Ω ′ , F ′ , P ′ ) from Section 2.1. Let for n ∈ N, t ∈ [0, T ] and i = 1, · · · , n, β n (t) : Ω ′ → U be such that α n −i = {α n,1 , . . . ,α n,i−1 , β n ,α n,i+1 , . . . ,α n,n } is an admissible control (i.e.α n −i ∈ U n ). The following is the main result of the section.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose Assumptions 3.1 and 4.1 hold. Letν,α n andα n −i , i = 1, . . . , n, n ∈ N be as introduced above. Then
Theorem 4.1 in particular says that for every ε > 0, there is n ∈ N sufficiently large such that α n forms an ε-Nash equilibrium in the n-player game.
The proof is given in the next three sections. First in Section 4.1 (Proposition 4.1) we will prove the convergence of empirical measures of the scaled queue length processes under controlsα n andα n −i toν. Next, in Section 4.2 (Proposition 4.2) we will prove the first equality in (4.3) and finally Proposition 4.3 in Section 4.3 will prove the inequality in (4.3).
Convergence of empirical measures
Let for i ∈ N,α n −i ∈ U n be as defined below Assumption 4.1. Let
δQ n,j , whereQ n,j is the controlled queue length process defined by (2.5) with α n replaced withα n −i . The following result gives the convergence ofν n −i toν. Proposition 4.1 Suppose Assumptions 3.1 and 4.1 hold. Then for every i ∈ N,ν n −i converges in probability, in
Proof: Without loss of generality we assume that i = 1. Recall that for j ∈ N,Q n,j is defined by (2.5) with α n replaced withα n −1 . Definẽ
whereÃ n,i ,D n,i are as in (2.3). Define for i = 1, . . . , n,
Note that since by assumption {Q n,i (0)} n i=1 are exchangeable and the controlsα n,i are given in terms of the same feedback functionα for each i = 2, . . . , n, the processes {G n,i } n i=2 are exchangeable. DefiningG n,i to be the zero process for i > n we can regard,G n .
as a random variable with values in D([0, T ] : (R 4 ) ⊗∞ ). We now argue the tightness of the sequence {G n }. It suffices to show for each i, the tightness of
the following two conditions are satisfied with X n equal to Ã n,i ,Ã n,j and D n,i ,D n,j for all i, j.
[A] For each ε > 0, η > 0 there exists a δ > 0 and n 0 ∈ N with the property that for every family of stopping times {τ n } n∈N (τ n being an F t -stopping time on (Ω ′ , F ′ , P ′ )) with τ n ≤ T − δ,
[ Suppose now that, along some subsequence,G n converges toG . 
We will now characterize the distribution of {Q i }. From tightness of {Ỹ n,i } n∈N and {R n,i } n∈N argued above and (2.6) it follows that 1 e n t 0 1 {Q n,i (s)=0} µ n,i (s)ds → 0, and 1
uniformly on [0, T ], in probability. Also, from (2.1) it follows that sup 0≤t≤T λ n,i (t) e n −λ + µ n,i (t) e n −μ → 0 a.s.
as n → ∞. Thus from (2.4) (and the relationλ =μ), for all i, j,
in probability, uniformly on [0, T ], as n → ∞. By standard martingale techniques it now follows that
, where {B i } are mutually independent standard Brownian motions. Also,
we have from the continuity of b (Assumption 3.1),α, and DVν, for i ≥ 2,
Once again using standard martingale arguments it follows that for 0
From weak uniqueness property noted in Section 3.2 and the fact thatν is a fixed point of Φ we now have thatQ i has distributionν for i = 2, 3, · · · . Using the fact that {B i } are mutually independent, a simple argument based on Girsanov's theorem shows that {Q i } are mutually independent as well. This characterize the distribution of {Q i } i≥2 asν ⊗∞ . We now have from (4.5), the definition of Ξ, and the law of large numbers that
δQ n,i = lim
The result follows. ✷ Remark 4.1 The above proof also shows that ifα n −1 =α n , namely β n =α n,1 , then (4.6) holds for all i ≥ 1 and the law of {Q i } i≥1 isν ⊗∞ .
Same strategy for all players
In this section we prove the equality in (4.3). 
Proof: Without loss of generality we assume i = 1. From the proof of Proposition 4.1 (see
where the processes on the right side are given through (4.6) with i = 1. Let
Recall that f and g are bounded continuous functions and from Proposition 4.1 we have that,
This shows that
Also by continuity of y and r
(4.9) as n → ∞. Also from Lemma 2.1,
where C 0 is as in (4.4) . Similarly, E sup 0≤t≤T (D n,1 (t)) 2 ≤ 4C 0 T . Combining these estimates
which combined with (4.9) and the boundedness of y, r implies
Combining this with the weak convergence in (4.9) we have
Combining (4.8) and (4.11) and recalling from the optimality ofα that
we have the desired convergence lim n→∞ J n,1 (Q n (0);α n ) = Vν(0, x). ✷
Deviation of Player 1
In this section we prove the inequality on the right side of (4.3). Proof: As before, we assume without loss of generality that i = 1. We will need to argue the tightness of the control sequence {β n } in an appropriate space. For this it will be convenient to consider a relaxed control formulation. Consider the relaxation of the stochastic control problem in (3.1)-(3.3) where the control space U is replaced by P(U ), the drift function b is replaced by the function
and the running cost function f is replaced by
Also, the class of admissible controls A(Ξ, t, x,ν) is replaced by A R (Ξ, t, x,ν) of pairs (α R , Z) that are similar to pairs (α, Z) introduced above (3.1) except that α R is P(U ) valued rather than U valued and (3.1) holds withb(u) = b(u, X(u), α(u)) replaced with b R (u, X(u), α R (u)). The corresponding cost function Jν ,R is defined by (3.2) with f replaced by f R . The value function in this relaxed formulation, denoted as Vν ,R , is given by (3.3) with A replaced by A R . Define the function h R by (3.7), replacing (f, b) with (f R , b R ). Then, from Assumption 3.1(b),
This shows that V ν and V ν,R are both solutions of the PDE (3.5) -(3.6). In view of the uniqueness result from Proposition 3.1,
is the space of finite measures on U × [0, T ] equipped with the topology of weak convergence. Then we can rewrite
(4.15)
From Proposition 4.1,ν n ⇒ν. Also, the arguments of the same proposition show that
. Suppose now that along a subsequence (labeled once more as {n}) the sequence in (4.16) along with {β n R } converges in distribution to (Q 1 , σB 1 , ϑ,β R ). Then from the Lipschitz property of b (Assumption 3.1(a)) we have, for t ∈ [0, T ],
where β R (s) is obtained by disintegratingβ, i.e.β R (du ds) = β R (s)(du)ds. Also as in the proof of Proposition 4.1 it can be argued that B 1 is a standard Brownian motion and thus we can conclude as in the proof of (4.6)
Once again, by a standard martingale argument, one can argue that for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T ,
Thus denoting by (Ω,F ,P) the probability space on which the limit processes are defined, Ξ = (Ω,F , {F t },P, B 1 ) is a system and (β R ,Z) ∈ A R (Ξ, 0, x,ν). Exactly as in the proof of Proposition 4.2 we see that the convergence in (4.11) holds. Also using the weak convergence
and the Lipschitz property of f in Assumption 3.1, we have
Combining the above convergence properties, we have as n → ∞,
Since the above holds for an arbitrary convergent subsequence of processes in (4.16) and the sequence {β n R }, the result follows. ✷
Numerical scheme for the MFG
Construction of an asymptotic Nash equilibrium for the queuing system in Section 2.1 requires the solution of the MFG introduced in Section 3. In general, tractable closed form expressions for the MFG solution are not available and thus one needs suitable numerical approximations. In this section we will use the Markov chain approximation method ( [45] ) to construct numerical solutions of the MFG. The main result of the section is Theorem 5.1. The numerical scheme is composed of two main steps. First, in Section 5.1 we construct a finite state, discrete time, controlled Markov chain and provide a numerical scheme to construct a measure over
. Then, in Section 5.2 we show that, under assumptions that include the existence of a unique solution of the MFG, the measure constructed from the chain converges to the solution of the MFG over a small time interval. Throughout the section we assume that Assumption 3.1 is satisfied and that (3.16) holds. We will introduce additional assumptions as needed. We now introduce the controlled Markov chain that will be used to approximate the solution of the MFG.
Approximating controlled Markov chains
In this section we construct a discrete-time Markov decision problem (MDP) that is used in Section 5.2 to approximate the MFG from Section 3.
Fix a discretization parameter h > 0 such that L is an integer multiple of h. Denote the h-grid {−h, 0, h, . . . , L + h} by S h . This is a discretized version of the state space [0, L]. Since 0 and L are reflecting barriers for the state process X in Section 3.1, we will consider two types of transition steps for the approximating chain. The first, which occurs when the chain is away from the boundary, will be referred to as the rate control step and the second occurs at the end points L + h and −h and is referred to as the reflection step.
Rate control step. For every
Note that y∈{x±h} q h (t, η, u; x, y) = 1
and that for 0 < h < σ 2 /c B , the transition probabilities are positive. Hereafter, these inequalities on h are in force. Also, define
This will be used to define the continuous time interpolation of the controlled Markov chain.
One can verify that the following local consistency conditions (cf. [45] ) hold for every x ∈ S h 0 .
Reflection step. Such a step occurs only when
We will now define a controlled Markov chain {X h,ν n } n∈N 0 associated with the parameter h and a measure ν ∈ P T,L . We will assume that T /∆ h .
= I(h) and L/h are integers.
−1 be a fixed element of U .
• Having defined for i = 0, 1, . . . , n time instants t h,ν i
< T and random variables
with values in S h and U respectively, let F h,ν i
• Choose the control α h,ν n for the n-th step that is a U valued F h,ν n measurable random variable and let X h,ν n+1 be such that the conditional distribution of X
n , ·) where ν(t) denotes the marginal distribution of ν at time instant t. Also define t h,ν n+1
where the indicator in the above definition will ensure that when we do a continuous time interpolation of the chain, reflection steps 'occur instantaneously'.
n , X h,ν n ) for some ϑ : T h × S h 0 → U then the function ϑ is referred to as a feedback control.
Some auxiliary processes. We will now introduce some processes that will be useful in the analysis of the h-th Markov chain. Consider the piecewise constant processes
One can verify that the following representation holds
Also, from (5.2) and (5.3) it follows that, on the set {X
. Then since n h,ν (t) for each fixed t is a {F h,ν j } stopping time, we have by optional sampling theorem that B h,ν (·) is a {G h,ν t } martingale. Also, from the above,
Cost function for the MDP. For every (t, x) ∈ T h × S h and any admissible control α h,ν used to construct the h-th controlled Markov chain, define the associated cost
The value function associated with the above cost is given by,
where the infimum is taken over all admissible controls. We now provide properties of the value function V h ν and the optimal strategy in the h-th MDP. For every (t, x, ν) ∈ T h × S h 0 × P T,L , define the h-th finite difference of the value function w.r.t. x, as follows
where we use the convention that
Lemma 5.1
The optimal control in the h-th MDP is given in state feedback form as 14) there exists a constant c d (T ) ∈ (0, ∞), such that for every (t, ν) ∈ T h × P T,L and for every h, one has,
where (X h,ν , B h,ν , Y h,ν , R h,ν ) are as in (5.5)-(5.7) with {α h,ν n } replaced with the optimal feedback control ϑ h,ν and for all (t,
Finally, c d (T ) can be taken to be a monotonically increasing function of T .
The proof of the lemma is given in Section 6.
The induced measure Φ h (ν). Recall from ( 
Next, we show that, under suitable conditions, Φ h is a contraction up to an O(h 2 ) term, over a small time interval. This 'almost-contraction' property lies at the heart of our main result, Theorem 5.
1. An almost-contraction property. Recall that we assume that Assumption 3.1 is satisfied. In addition, we will make the following assumption on a Lipschitz property of the functionα from (3.9).
The following lemma gives a sufficient condition for Assumption 5.1 to hold.
Lemma 5.2 Suppose that the drift and the cost functions satisfy the following properties.
(a) For every (t, η, x, α)
Then Assumption 5.1 is satisfied.
The proof of the lemma is deferred to Section 6. [21] are stronger. Also, parts (b) and (c) above that concern the running cost are imposed by [31] , which studies a rate control problem (part (a) is irrelevant for that model). A basic example that satisfies parts (a)-(c) in the Lemma, in addition to Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, is the following
We note that, although Assumption 3.2 is not explicitly imposed in the sequel, we will assume later in the section that the MFG has a unique solution (see Assumption 5.2) which from Theorem 3.1 holds under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2. For this reason we presented an example that satisfies all three assumptions (i.e Assumptions 3.1, 3.2 and 5.1). From a modeling perspective, by choosing positive and nondecreasing a 3 and a 4 and a positive a 3 , the system planner penalizes all servers collectively for congestion when the empirical measure has high a 3 and a 4 -moments and in addition it penalizes individual servers for long queues. Also, when a 7 > 0, rejections of jobs by an individual server are disincentivized and when a 6 < 0, idleness is being rewarded. Finally a convex nondecreasing k assigns costs for increasing the rates.
The next result plays an important role in the proof of Theorem 5.1. Recall Assumption 3.1 and (3.16) are in force.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose that Assumption 5.1 is satisfied. Then there existT > 0,ĥ > 0 and q ∈ (0, 1), such that for every T ≤T , ν, ν ′ ∈ P T,L and h ∈ (0,ĥ ∧T ),
Proof of the proposition is given in Section 6.
Approximating the solution of the MFG.
We now provide the numerical scheme that approximates the solution of the MFG from Section 3.
Construction 5.2 LetT ,ĥ be as in Proposition 5.1. Fix T <T and (
} be the h-th Markov chain from Construction 5.1 associated with the optimal controlα h,ν 1 . Having defined for m ∈ N the process {X h,ν m n }, set ν m+1 .
= Φ h (ν m ) and let {X h,ν m+1 n } be the h-th Markov chain from Construction 5.1 associated with the optimal controlα h,ν m+1 .
With q ∈ (0, 1) as in Proposition 5.1 we get that for every h as in Construction 5.2 and every m ∈ N,
By iterating this bound we obtain
We note that k h depends also on ν 1 , however, it plays no role in the sequel and is therefore omitted from the notation.
As an immediate consequence of the definition of ν h , we get the following proposition, which is key to the proof of the approximation result in Theorem 5.1 below. 
We can now present the main result of this section. The statement of the theorem and its proof use relaxed controls. Recall the definitions of M(U × [0, T ]), A R , b R , and J ν,R , given in the proof of Proposition 4.
Also, recall Assumption 3.1 and (3.16) are in force throughout this section. 
in P T,L where the limit processes defined on some probability space (Ω, F, P) satisfy the following.
(b) Disintegrating m(du ds) = m s (du)ds, the following relationship holds a.s. 
. Also, recalling the definition of the interpolated processes (right before (5.17)) it can be checked that
Combining this with the tightness of {X h,ν h } and the fact that Φ h (ν h ) = P•(X h,ν h ) −1 gives the relative compactness of {Φ h (ν h )} in P T,L . Suppose now that along a subsequence (relabeled again as {h}) 
where m(duds) = m s (du)ds. Using the continuity property of the Skorohod map we now get (b). Also, part (c) is immediate on using (5.28), recalling that Φ h (ν h ) is the probability law of X h,ν h , and by (5.31).
Clearly (m, Z) ∈ A R (Ξ, 0, x, ν). We will now argue that
This will prove that ν solves the MFG and thus from Assumption 5.2 and Remark 5.2 we will get part (d). Since the convergent subsequence was arbitrary, we will get the convergence asserted in the statement of the theorem and complete the proof. Proof of (5.32). For the rest of the proof we consider the subsequence along which the convergence in (5.29) and (5.30) holds. Using arguments similar to those in Proposition 4.2 it can be checked that lim
where we dropped the arguments t = 0 and x. Next, let (β, Z) ∈ A(Ξ, 0, x, ν) for some system Ξ = (Ω,F , {F t },P,B). We will now show that for every ε 0 > 0 there is a sequence of controls {β h,ν h i
• For some δ > 0, β ε is piecewise constant on intervals of the form [lδ, (l + 1)δ), l = 0, 1, . . . , T /δ. For some finite set U ε ⊂ U , β ε (s) takes values in U ε for every s ∈ [0, T ].
• For some θ > 0, for each u ∈ U ε
where for suitableÎ,L ∈ N,
•
We will now use the piecewise constant control β ε to construct a collection of control sequences {β h,ν h i } as stated above (5.34) and for which
Note that since θ 1 (ε) → 0 as ε → 0, this will prove (5.34) and complete the proof of the theorem. The construction is carried out as follows.
• Define X h,ν h 0 = x h,ν h , t 1 0 = 0 and let β h,ν h −1 be a fixed element of U ε .
• Having defined for i = 0, 1, . . . , n time instants t h,ν h i
< T and random variables
with values in S h and U ε respectively, let
• Choose the control β h,ν h n for the n-th step that is a U ε valued F h,ν h n measurable random variable as follows:
, and n h,ν h (·) is as in (5.6).
• Let X h,ν h n+1 be such that its conditional distribution given
, ·) where ν h is as introduced above Theorem 5.1. Also define
. Exactly as in the first part of the proof we now have that we now have that (Z ε , m ε ) has the same law as (Z, m) for every limit point of the chosen further subsequence. Since the chosen further subsequence was arbitrary, this proves the weak convergence of (Z h,ν h , m h,ν h ) to (Z ε , m ε ) along the subsequence fixed above (5.33) and arguing once again as in the proof of Proposition 4.2 we have the convergence of costs as in (5.37), completing the proof of the theorem. ✷
Proofs of Results from Section 5
In this section we provide the proofs of Lemmas 5.1, 5.2 and Proposition 5.1.
Proof of Lemma 5.1: We start by analyzing the evolution of the value function V h ν . Clearly, V h ν (T, x) = g(ν(T ), x) for all x ∈ S h 0 . Using backwards induction, we get that for any (t, x, ν) ∈ T h × S h 0 × P T,L , one has from the definition ofα h,ν (cf. + q h (t, ν(t),α h,ν (t, x); x, x + h)V h ν (t + ∆ h , x + h) + q h (t, ν(t),α h,ν (t, x); x, x − h)V h ν (t + ∆ h , x − h), whereα h,ν is as in (5.14). The above identity in particular shows that ϑ h,ν gives an optimal feedback control. We now use (6.1) to prove (5.15) . Define the following h-th finite differences for (t, x) ∈ T h × S h 0 ,
Simplifying (6.1) by using (5.12), we get that Proof of Proposition 5.1: We begin by introducing a coupling between two optimally controlled chains, one associated with ν and the other with ν ′ .
Coupling. Fix x ∈ [0, L] and ν, ν ′ ∈ P T,L . Let {X ν n } and {X ν ′ n } be the Markov chains from Construction 5.1 associated with the parameter h and the optimal strategies given by (5.14). Denote by Σ ν = (n ν , F ν , B ν , X ν , Y ν , R ν ) and Σ ν ′ = (n ν ′ , F ν ′ , B ν ′ , X ν ′ , Y ν ′ , R ν ′ ) the processes that were defined immediately after Construction 5.1, where we suppressed the index h since it is fixed in the rest of the proof. Also, denote
where l h (t) = ⌊t/∆ h ⌋∆ h . Similarly define b ν ′ . We now define a coupling of the chains through a time change of an underlying Markov chain {(Z ν n , Z ν ′ n )}. The main idea in the construction of the latter Markov chain is to keep track of the proper time. Whenever an 'instantaneous jump' occurs for only one of the Z-processes, the other process has a degenerate step, that is, it remains at the same position. Therefore, we use two sequences of times. The first, which we refer as time instants, {t n } has the same role as in (5.4). The second is referred as time steps and denoted by {(N ν n , N ν ′ n )}. Each of the components counts how many non-degenerate steps the respective Z process has done so far.
Set Z ν 0 = Z ν ′ 0 = x 0 , t 0 = 0, and N ν 0 = N ν ′ 0 = 0. Having defined for i = 0, 1, . . . , n time instants t ν i < T , time steps N ν i , N ν ′ i ∈ N, and random variables Z ν i , Z ν ′ i with values in S h , define them for the (n + 1)-th step as follows.
• If Z ν n , Z ν ′ n / ∈ {−h, L + h}, then • If Z ν n / ∈ {−h, L + h} and Z ν ′ n ∈ {−h, L + h} then The transition probabilities when Z ν ′ n / ∈ {−h, L + h} and Z ν n ∈ {−h, L + h} are defined similarly.
• If Z ν n , Z ν ′ n ∈ {−h, L + h}, then with probability 1, • For every n ∈ N, set
where M ν n . = max{m : N ν m ≤ n} and similarly M ν ′ n is defined. With the above construction {X ν n } and {X ν ′ n } are controlled Markov chains constructed using the optimal feedback controlsα ν andα ν ′ respectively, given on the same probability space. Also relationships (5.5)-(5.8) are satisfied by Σ ν and Σ ν ′ . The above coupling of the two processes gives the joint evolution (X ν (t), X ν ′ (t)) 0≤t≤T as follows. X ν (0) = X ν ′ (0) = x 0 and for every t ∈ T h ,
h½ {X ν (t) =L} , −h½ {X ν ′ (t) =0} , w.p. h(∆b(t)) + /(2σ 2 ), −h½ {X ν (t) =0} , h½ {X ν ′ (t) =L} , w.p. h(∆b(t)) − /(2σ 2 ), −h½ {X ν (t) =0} , −h½ {X ν ′ (t) =0} , w.p. (−h max{b ν (t), b ν ′ (t)} + σ 2 )/(2σ 2 ), where ∆b(t)
We also define the corresponding 'unconstrained' increment as
(h, h) , w.p. (h min{b ν (t), b ν ′ (t)} + σ 2 )/(2σ 2 ), (h, −h) , w.p. h(∆b(t)) + /(2σ 2 ), (−h, h) , w.p. h(∆b(t)) − /(2σ 2 ), (−h, −h) , w.p. (−h max{b ν (t), b ν ′ (t)} + σ 2 )/(2σ 2 ), (6.2) Bounding W 2 1 (Φ h (ν), Φ h (ν ′ )). Denote ∆X(t) . = X ν (t) − X ν ′ (t). The processes ∆B, ∆R and ∆Y are defined similarly. Note that
We now estimate E[|∆X| 2 Therefore,
E[|∆X|
By squaring both sides and taking expectations, we have
✷
Proof of (5.16): Fix ν ∈ P T,L , x = x ′ in S h 0 , and t 0 ∈ T h , which will be regarded as the initial time. As in the proof of Proposition 5.1, one can define a coupling of two processes on the same h-grid, both of which are driven by the same ν. The first one is denoted as (X(s), Y (s), R(s), B(s), α(s)) t 0 ≤s≤T , where its components are defined in (5.5)-(5.7) with X(t 0 ) = x and α is the optimal policy for this process. The second process, denoted as (X ′ (s), Y ′ (s), R ′ (s), B ′ (s), α(s)) t 0 ≤s≤T is also given by (5.5)-(5.7) using the same control process {α(s)} as for the first one, except that the second one starts at x ′ , i.e. X ′ (t 0 ) = x ′ .
For every s ∈ [t 0 , T ], let ∆X(s) . = X(s) − X ′ (s) and ∆b(s) . = b(l h (s), ν(l h (s)), X(s), α(s)) − b(l h (s), ν(l h (s)), X ′ (s), α(s)).
Processes ∆Y (s) and ∆R(s) are defined in a similar manner. By definition ∆X(0) = x − x ′ . The arguments that lead to (6.9) can also be applied here, but in fact they are simpler here
